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Irrational distinctions tend to be unreliable. That is nowhere more true than in the field of 
deficiency judgments, where almost every statement made in one decision gets repudiated in 
another. It has just happened again, with regard to the “other security” variant of the purchase 
money antideficiency defense, with the result that one device that everyone thought was safe is 
again in jeopardy. 
The Purchase Money Prohibition (CCP §580b) 
California law creates a series of obstacles to a lienholder seeking a deficiency judgment (i.e., 
a personal judgment against the defaulting trustor (b rower) of a secured real property loan for 
the difference between the amount owed and the amount produced by a foreclosure sale of the 
security for the debt). See California Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice, chap 4 (2d ed Cal 
CEB 1990). One of the antideficiency rules, CCP §580b, explicitly prohibits a deficiency 
judgment against a borrower after the foreclosure sal of real property that secures a purchase 
money loan. Code of Civil Procedure §580b defines purchase money as (1) a loan by a third 
party lender used to pay all or part of the purchase price of a one-to-four unit residential dwelling 
occupied in whole or in part by the buyer, or (2) a lo n by the seller for the balance of the 
purchase price of property sold to the buyer. Thus, the statute denies a deficiency judgment to 
specified residential lenders, and to all sellers, whether they sold the buyer residential or 
commercial property or raw land. 
Like most statutes, CCP §580b gives no reasons for its results, but our courts seem to have an 
overpowering urge to fill in missing reasons. 
“Purposes” of CCP §580b 
Brown v Jensen (1953) 41 C2d 193, 259 P2d 425, was the first opini n to ascribe purposes to 
CCP §580b. Brown involved a senior lienholder who foreclosed, thus wiping out a seller’s junior 
purchase money lien. Because the junior’s security was entirely destroyed and it no longer had a 
lien on the property, it was a “sold-out” junior. The junior then tried to sue the trustor on the 
note. Brown held that the junior’s action, although technically not an action for a deficiency 
because the junior had not previously foreclosed, was the functional equivalent of an attempt to 
obtain a deficiency judgment, and thus was barred by CCP §580b. Brown said the purposes of 
CCP §580b were (1) to make the seller look only to the security for recovery of a purchase 
money debt, and (2) to put the risk that the property’s value would become inadequate on the 
seller because of its superior knowledge of the value of the security. The dissent, however, 
contended that the statute’s purpose was to stop underbidding. Ten years later, in Roseleaf v 
Chierighino (1963) 59 C2d 35, 27 CR 873, Justice Traynor maintained that all three of those 
purposes were wrong: (1) The statement that the benficiary must look only to the security was a 
conclusion, not an explanation; (2) the legislature did not likely intend to base the buyer’s 
protection on the seller’s superior knowledge; and (3) underbidding is deterred by fair value rules 
(CCP §580a), not purchase money rules. 
Roseleaf’s repudiation of Brown’s reasons might have been expected to lead to a contrary 
result (i.e., not applying CCP §580b to a sold-out junior), but Justice Traynor decided to change 
the reasons rather than the rule. The new purposes of CCP §580b, in his view, were to discourage 
overvaluation and to prevent the aggravation of economic downturns resulting from deficiency 
liability. Were it not for Justice Traynor’s great stature, these reasons would have been laughed 
off long ago. As far as overvaluation is concerned, no seller reduces its price because it might be 
barred from recovering a deficiency judgment; rather, it raises the price to compensate for that 
risk. Additionally, the buyer is more inclined, rather than less, to accept an inflated price because 
it has antideficiency protection. Regarding the antidepression theory, protecting the buyer at the 
expense of the seller after a senior foreclosure merely shifts the loss from one to the other, 
equally worsening any economic downturn (as the supreme court was itself to acknowledge later 
in Spangler v Memel (1972) 7 C3d 603, 102 CR 807).  
Variants and Purposes 
Roseleaf accepted the Brown logic that CCP §580b barred a deficiency judgment for a sold-
out junior whose lien secured a purchase money loan. However, Roseleaf limited the logic to the 
“standard” purchase money mortgage transaction (e.g., in which a seller takes back from the 
buyer a note secured by the property that was sold). Because the sold-out junior (seller) in 
Roseleaf decided to take back a note secured by other properties owned by the buyer instead of 
the property sold, Roseleaf held that the transaction was a “variant” of the standard transaction. 
The court reasoned that in variant transactions the purposes of CCP §580b are to be examined to 
determine whether the statute should apply in that particular case. The Roseleaf court concluded 
that CCP §580b did not bar the junior’s (seller’s) action on the note in this particular variant of 
the standard transaction. This holding became known as the “other security” exception to CCP 
§580b. 
Justice Traynor’s economic notions as expressed in Roseleaf are able to survive because in 
standard transactions CCP §580b is applied “automatically,” i.e., no one gets to argue that the 
logic would not pass a high school economics course. In variant transactions, however, as noted 
above, the purposes of CCP §580b are to be considered in finding the correct result. This is 
where irrationality leads to instability. 
Roseleaf was a variant in that the seller took back a deed of trust on other property, rather than 
that which it sold to the buyer. Ordinary lay people might think that a seller who insists on 
different property as security for the price of what was sold is more likely than not to be 
overvaluing it, and that the effect on a depression is the same whether the buyer owes a 
deficiency judgment after losing either parcel A (the sold property) or parcel B (other property). 
However, in holding that the Roseleaf seller could recover on a purchase money note as a sold-
out junior, Justice Traynor held that the purposes w nt the other way for this variant. 
If a variant can attain the same impregnable status s a standard transaction, we lawyers can 
nonetheless work with it, despite its total absurdity: If deficiency protection is desired, the deed 
of trust is put on the property sold; if deficiency exposure is wanted, then it should cover other 
security instead. Indeed, such a strategy seemed almost recommended in another Traynor 
opinion, Kistler v Vasi (1969) 71 C2d 261, 78 CR 170. (In Kistler, the buyer paid the seller’s 
broker with a deed of trust from buyer directly to the broker, rather than give paper to the seller 
to be assigned to the broker. The court allowed the broker to sue the buyer for a deficiency 
judgment and rejected the buyer’s argument that, because the seller’s commission obligation was 
discharged by giving the broker the buyer’s deed of trust, the transaction was in effect a purchase 
money loan by the seller.) 
The recent case of Conley v Matthes (1997) 56 CA4th 1453, 66 CR2d 518 (reported at 20 
CEB RPLR 244 (Oct. 1997)), however, has shattered th  supposedly settled “other security” 
variant, and held that a variant may have feet of clay. In this case, Conley sold two properties to 
Matthes, taking back a second deed of trust on one parcel to secure part of the price of the other 
parcel. When a senior lien foreclosure wiped out Conley’s second, he sued as a sold-out junior, 
claiming protection under the “other security variant.” He lost because, according to the Second 
District Court of Appeal, the two sales were so close y related that “the ‘other’ property is not 
really ‘other.’” 56 CA4th at 1463. Roseleaf was distinguished on the ground that the other 
property in that case was “completely foreign to the ransaction,” whereas the properties in 
Conley were a package deal. 56 CA4th at 1464. Thus, the CCP §580b policies were held to lead 
to protection rather than exposure for the buyer. 
If other security must be “really other” to fit the Roseleaf variant, can deals be structured to fit 
it? Conley’s analysis of “really other” security is too filled with moralisms and other extraneous 
considerations to give the bar much help. The transaction was an integrated package at the 
beginning, but by the time of closing it had broken down into two separate sales, the second sale 
being entirely optional and independent of the first. We may surmise that any arrangement with 
more integration than this (i.e., any extensive cross-referencing) may be called “not really other.” 
I doubt, however, that we can predict how much less interrelation between the parcels is 
sufficient to make it really “other security.” If the other security is, for instance, found to be 
“necessary to the consummation of the sale” (56 CA4th at 1461) because the deal won’t close 
otherwise, how likely is it that a court will regard it as “unrelated” and deny the buyer deficiency 
protection? 
As yet, there is no legal risk in taking other security to secure a seller’s note, even if that 
security is later deemed related to the sold property. The arrangement may not help the seller, but 
it should not hurt. (Who among us, however, is willing to wager against the possibility of a 
decision coming down to the effect that a seller who takes other security rather than its own gets 
no security interest whatsoever, or, worse, becomes a debtor rather than a creditor of the buyer? 
That would surely deter overvaluation in some parallel universe.) 
